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Many cloud service providers (CSPs) provide on-demand service at a price with a small delay. We propose
a QoS-differentiated model where multiple SLAs deliver both on-demand service for latency-critical users
and delayed services for delay-tolerant users at lower prices. Two architectures are considered to fulfill SLAs.
The first is based on priority queues. The second simply separates servers into multiple modules, each for
one SLA. As an ecosystem, we show that the proposed framework is dominant-strategy incentive compatible.
Although the first architecture appears more prevalent in the literature, we prove the superiority of the second
architecture, under which we further leverage queueing theory to determine the optimal SLA delays and
prices. Finally, the viability of the proposed framework is validated through numerical comparison with the
on-demand service and it exhibits a revenue improvement in excess of 200%. Our results can help CSPs design
optimal delay-differentiated services and choose appropriate serving architectures.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) market is projected to grow to $61.9 billion in 2021 from
$30.5 billion in 2018 [1], and is attracting users with different purposes to run their applications
on cloud servers. Many cloud service providers (CSPs) provide the standard on-demand service,
which is always available at a publicly known price p with a small delay. When a customer1 arrives,
it requests to occupy servers for some period without interruption, and a delay arises, i.e., the
time from the request arrival to the service commencement. While delay is a key constraint to
resource efficiency, customers often differ in the sensitivity to it [2, 3]. Price differentiation by
delays is thus an important research direction to satisfy the customer’ preference. Related schemes
often use queuing theory for performance analysis and incentive compatibility (IC) to ensure
user truthfulness, eliminating the unpredictable effect of non-truthful strategic behaviour on the
performance.
One line of work considers an architecture of separating servers into two parts respectively for
on-demand and spot markets [4, 5]. Each customer has an initial individual willingness-to-pay
(WTP) that further decreases linearly with the delay. The associated slope c defines how sensitive it
is to delay, and is called delay-cost type. It will choose to join one market or neither to maximize its
surplus. For any customer of spot market, Abhishek et al. show that, there is a pricing rule to form
a Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible mechanism (BNIC), i.e., it will truthfully bid c if the others
also do so [4]. The customers of higher bids can preempt the servers of others, and each type of
customers has an individual service class whose delay relies on the job arrival rate of higher bids.
Dierks and Seuken extend the model by considering additional constraints such as preemption cost
and the capacity finiteness of on-demand market [5].
Differently from [4, 5], we consider the following dimensions. First, it is general to use a family
of concave functions to more precisely characterize the WTPs of users [6, 7]. Second, in the current
1In this paper, we use customers and users interchangeably.
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cloud markets, the price p of a CSP is a predefined value that depends on not only WTPs but also
other factors such as competition. It is acceptable for most users. We thus consider the case that the
initial WTPs of users are all p, implying their acceptability of on-demand service, and study price
differentiation by delays under such context. Third, the delay-cost types can be tremendous and it is
operationally costly to maintain an individual service level agreement (SLA) for each type of users
[8]. Fourth, we focus on non-preemptive scheduling, i.e., the service is continuously provisioned to
the customer with no interruption. Preemptions are costly and can increase uncertainties within
the delays [9, 10].
Model. The standard on-demand service is the fastest service and designed with the principle of
“one size fits all” to satisfy all types of users. We propose a model of offering a limited number
of SLAs to provide incentives and service differentiation among users. These SLAs include both
on-demand service for latency-critical jobs, and services with different levels of delay at lower
prices. The service model is supported by an underlying architecture to fulfill SLAs. Two typical
ones are considered. One is similar to the spot market in [4, 5], called the priority-based sharing
(PBS) architecture, where delay-tolerant jobs can access the servers of on-demand market in lower
priorities. The other simply separates servers into multiple modules, each for one SLA, called the
separated multi-SLAs (SMS) architecture.
The proposed model may benefit all market participants. Potential customers get opportunity
to trade their delay tolerance for cheaper service. The CSP can thus attract more such customers
from its competitors. In queuing systems, the larger the delay, the higher the resource utilization.
Delay-differentiated services allow processing more workload than a pure on-demand service,
possibly improving its revenue.
Results. As an ecosystem, we derive the main features of the model above, and the main results of
this paper are as follows:
(i) We derive a generic pricing rule that gives the optimal SLA prices when the SLA delays
are given in advance, and show that the proposed model is dominant-strategy incentive
compatible (DSIC): every user truthfully reports its delay-cost type, regardless of what the
others do. DSIC is a stronger degree of IC than BNIC that assumes that an individual customer
has the global knowledge of the distribution on user types, which is not needed in DSIC [11].
(ii) The architecture determines the model’s performance. We derive two performance bounds
respectively under the PBS and SMS architectures. They show the superiority of a SMS-based
service system where a PBS-based system in fact achieves a similar revenue to a pure on-
demand system. We then leverage queueing theory to give the optimal SLA prices and delays
of a SMS-based system. Finally, we give numerical results to show that it can significantly
outperform the standard on-demand service model, with a revenue improvement in excess
of 200%.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the related work.
We propose the delay-differentiated service model in Section 3. Next, we study in Section 4 the
related pricing problems. We describe two architectures in Section 5 to support the service model
differently, and analyze their performance and optimal parameter configuration. Simulations are
done in Section 6 to evaluate the performance numerically. Finally, we conclude this paper in
Section 7. Due to space limitation, all proofs of conclusions are put in the appendix.
2 RELATEDWORK
CSPs can offer spot service where customers bid to utilize servers, similar to what Amazon Elastic
Cloud Compute (EC2) does. The combination of queue and game theories is used to characterize
user behavior and request serving [12, 13]. Currently, two main models exist for CPS systems.
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The first model is proposed by Abhishek et al. [4], which has been partly introduced before. There
are n classes of jobs whose mean service time is s . Each job of type i ∈ [1,n] has an initial WTP vi
and a linear delay-cost type Ci that is a random variable in [0, s · vi ]. The on-demand market is
modeled as aG/G/∞ queue with infinite servers to guarantee that the service delay φ is zero for
all jobs. The spot market is modeled as a preemptive G/G/m queue with finite servers in which
each job bids; the higher its bid, the higher its priority to access servers and the lower its delay.
Dierks and Seuken extend the first model by considering additional constraints and modeling
the on-demand market as a G/G/m queue with finite servers [5]; thus, the on-demand service is
delivered to customers with a small delayT . Finally, their mathematical expressions are instantiated
with regard to M/M/m queues, and numerical results are given to show the concrete revenue
improvement of this model over the pure on-demand service model.
The second model focuses on enabling users to utilize the idleness of on-demand market. The idle
periods of servers appear at random and are utilized as spot service by users who bid the highest
[14]. Wu et al. show that the challenge is guaranteeing the immediacy of on-demand service and
the persistence of spot service while sharing servers [15]. Then, they give an integral resource
allocation and pricing framework for this purpose, and it forms a DSIC mechanism. They basically
follow the pricing principle used by Amazon EC2 in practice [16] and show how to run such
services in cloud systems. Song and Guérin focus on the statistical features of the spot pricing
aspect and give the optimal pricing and bidding strategies for a CSP and its users respectively [7].
The spot service is also delay-differentiated in the sense that if a user bids higher, its delay will
be smaller. For the sake of tractability, the authors also use a family of linear delay-cost functions
to characterize the users’ sensitivity to delay; numerical results are given for the more general
settings including a family of concave functions. Finally, spot service is popular in that users can
trade their delay tolerance for cheaper service. However, it indeed creates significant complexity
that users have to face and does not provide any delay guarantee [17–19].
Additionally, there are many works that use the theory of auction and mechanism design to
explore potential frameworks for selling computing resource that take into account deadlines
[2, 20–22] or virtual machine configuration [23], under which the availability of resource depends
on a customer’s bid and is uncertain. However, in practice, it is often desirable to offer an on-demand
market as an option of customers such that the computing service is certainly available at a fixed
unit price, as we see for most of products and services in real world. This is also one motivation of
the models of this paper and [4, 5, 15].
3 A QOS-DIFFERENTIATED SERVICE MODEL
In this section, we describe the proposed QoS-differentiated service model, and the associated
questions to be addressed. The service model is generic and we postpone the description of the
ways of fulfilling its SLAs, which will be given after we study the model properties.
3.1 Delay-Cost Curves
Each customer j requests at time aj to occupy servers for some time sj . We equivalently refer
to such a request as a job j, aj as arrival time, and sj as service time. Upon arrival, a job may get
served with some delay φ, i.e., it will get served at time aj +φ; then, the service stops until the job is
continuously served for a duration sj . The standard on-demand service in cloud markets represents
the fastest service to satisfy all users. We use T and p to denote its delay and price, and they are
fixed system parameters: T is the minimum delay before a user can get served where φ ≥ T , and p
is the maximum price that a user need to pay for service.
In cloud markets, the WTPs of latency-critical jobs drop sharply even if the delay is increased
slightly. For delay-tolerant jobs, although they prefer to get service earlier, their WTPs decrease
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slowly before the delay increases to a threshold, after which their WTPs decrease sharply [24]. The
situation of both types of jobs is unified and characterized by a family of functions, denoted by
u(α ,φ).
Property 1. The WTP function u(α ,φ) is assumed to have the following properties where α is a
positive real number and φ ∈ [T ,+∞):
(i) Normalisation: for all α ∈ R+, we have u(α ,T ) = p;
(iii) Non-increasing: fixing the value of α , u(α ,φ) is decreasing in φ;
(ii) Monotone Parametrisation: fixing the value of φ, u(α ,φ) is decreasing in α when φ > T ;
(iv) Decreasing speed: fixing the value of φ, ∂u∂φ is decreasing in α .
The number of users is finite. Each user will choose a specific value of α that can best fit its
sensitivity to delay, and α is said to be its delay-cost type. The first subproperty implies that, all
users can accept on-demand service at a price p since their WTPs are all p when the delay isT . The
second subproperty means that, the WTP of a user will decrease as the delay φ increases. The third
subproperty states under the same delay φ that, the larger of the value of α , the smaller the WTP
u(α ,φ). Thus, when the delay increases from T to a larger φ, a user of larger α has more value loss
and is more sensitive to delay. ∂u∂φ represents the slope of the tangent line at a point. The fourth
subproperty guarantees that, if a user has a larger α , the decreasing speed of its WTP is also larger.
The function instances can be of any form and the conclusions of this paper will hold only if
they satisfy Property 1. In fact, it can be satisfied by many typical functions in pricing literature.
Specifically, the WTP functions can be a family of linear functions in [4, 5] where the value loss
is characterized by α · φ when the delay is φ. More interestingly, they can also be a family of
concave functions [6] where the value loss is α ·U (φ), whereU (φ) is an increasing convex function;
then, u(α ,φ) = p − α · U (φ). As discussed before, they can precisely characterize the following
phenomenon: the WTP decreases slightly as delay increases before a threshold; then, it decreases
significantly.
For example, the WTP functions can be instantiated as
u(α ,φ) = p ·
(
1 − (α · (φ −T ))β
)
, φ ∈ [T ,+∞). (1)
where β ≥ 2 and β is a fixed parameter. Here, U (φ) = p · (φ −T )β , and u(α ,φ) = p − α β ·U (φ). We
use the term α β , rather than the term α in [6], as the coefficient ofU (φ) to simplify the subsequent
computation of φ0; However, this only affects the user’s choice of the values of α to specify the
same relation between WTP and delay: choosing α ′ with the function (1) is equivalent to choosing
α ′′ = (α ′)β with the function of the form in [6]. The function in (1) is concave and satisfies
Property 1. Given a customer of type α , its WTP becomes zero when the experienced delay φ equals
φ0 =
1
α +T , i.e., u(α ,φ0) = 0. When the customer experiences a delay no smaller than 1α +T (i.e.,
φ ≥ 1α +T ), it will not accept any service since its WTP is not positive.
We illustrate the function (1) in Fig. 1 where T is set to zero. As illustrated by the solid curves,
latency-critical and delay-tolerant users can respectively choose larger and smaller α to reflect
their sensitivities to delay, conforming to the explanation of the third subproperty. As illustrated by
the leftmost solid curve where φ0 = 0.2, a user’s WTP will decrease faster and faster as the delay
increases, since the function in (1) is concave. When the delay φ ranges in the first half interval[
0, φ02
]
, the WTP decreases slowly from p to 0.875 ·p; as φ becomes larger and ranges in the second
half interval
[ φ0
2 , φ0
]
, the WTP decreases fast from 0.875 · p to 0.
Finally, the value of β affects the decreasing speed of WTP as the delay increases. The leftmost
solid and dashed curves illustrate the cases with β = 3 and β = 6. A larger β means that the initial
decreasing speed is smaller but then turns larger. In this paper, we study the property of a market
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Fig. 1. The Curves of WTP Function in (1) for different values of the parameters (α , β).
that consists of customers whose sensitivities to delay are defined by the values of α ; when the
instance in (1) is applied, the parameter β is common.
3.2 The QoS-Differentiated Service Model
The CSP plans to offer a finite number of L Service Level Agreements (SLAs). For all l ∈ [1,L], the
l-th SLA specifies a delay φl and the price pl of utilizing a server per unit of time; for the customers
operating under the l-th SLA, whenever their requests arrive, the CSP guarantees that the expected
delay of delivering service is at most φl . The first SLA represents the standard on-demand service in
cloud markets, and it is for latency-critical users who are not willing to tolerate significant delays.
Thus, p1 and φ1 equal the price and delay of an on-demand service. The prices of the other SLAs
are lower than p1, at the expense of delaying the delivery of computing services to their consumers;
here, we let
T = φ1 < φ2 < · · · < φL . (2)
Further, we have for all l ∈ [1,L − 1] that the price of the l-th SLA is larger than the price of the
(l + 1)-th SLA; otherwise, users would prefer the l-th SLA with a smaller delay. Thus, we have
p = p1 > p2 > · · · > pL . We note that p and T are fixed parameters, and {φl }Ll=2 and {pl }Ll=2 are
decision variables.
The interaction process between a CSP and its customers is illustrated in Fig. 2. Specifically, each
customer who enters the service system will choose a value α ∈ R+ such that u(α ,φ) can best fit
its sensitivity to delay; then, it reports the chosen α to the CSP. Users of the same α is said to have
the same delay-cost type. The CSP aims to satisfy all its customers, without rejecting any service
request, since all customers can accept on-demand service. Under an arbitrary SLA l ∈ [1,L], the
surplus of a customer is its WTP minus the SLA price, i.e., u(α ,φl ) − pl . According to the reported
type, the CSP will choose one SLA for each type of customers such that their surplus is maximized.
Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 3.1. The customers of type α are assigned the lα -th SLA defined below:
lα = arg max
l ∈[1,L]
u(α ,φl ) − pl . (3)
Specifically, the CSP regulates that, if the customer achieves the same maximum surplus under
multiple SLAs, it will be assigned to the SLA whose number is the largest.
3.3 Problem Description
Each customer submits its delay-cost type α to the CSP that in turn assigns a specific SLA to it.
The types of all customers constitute a set Φ; the minimum and maximum values of the elements
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A customer
Report its type 𝛼 Cloud provider who 
offers 𝐿 SLAs
Assign the 𝑙𝛼-th SLA 
Computation by Definition 1
Fig. 2. The interaction between customers and a CSP.
of Φ are α and α . Let P(α) ∈ (0, 1) denote the probability that an arriving customer has a delay-cost
type α , where
∑
α ∈Φ P(α) = 1. The mean arrival rate of the jobs of all types is Λ, and the mean job
size is s . For all l ∈ [1,L], let Φl denote the set of the types of the customers who are assigned to
the l-th SLA, and P = {Φ1,Φ2, · · · ,ΦL} where ∑Ll=1 Φl = Φ and Φl1 ∩ Φl2 = ∅ for all l1, l2 ∈ [1,L]
with l1 , l2. Thus, the mean job arrival rate of the l-th SLA is
Λl = Λ ·
∑
α ∈Φl
P(α). (4)
The total workload of customers that is processed per unit of time under the l-th SLA iswl = Λl · s .
The revenue from the l-th SLA per unit of time is pl ·wl = pl · Λl · s . The total revenue obtained
per unit of time is
G =
∑L
l=1
pl ·wl =
∑L
l=1
pl · Λl · s . (5)
Above, the system input includes Φ, P(·), Λ, s ,m, φ1, p1 and the decision variables include {φl }Ll=2,
{pl }Ll=2, and P.
For all l ∈ [1,L], the l-th SLA guarantees that its jobs experiences a delay of at most φl . Let
Θ = (φ1,φ2, · · · ,φL). The P determines the job arrival rate of each SLA by (4). Roughly, in a
queuing system, the more the available servers, the smaller the actual experienced delay of serving
jobs. When there are x servers and P is given, the actual delay tl of the jobs of SLA l ∈ [1,L] is a
non-increasing function of x . Suppose there are a total of x =m servers for fulfilling all SLAs. Let
T = (t1, t2, · · · , tL), and the CSP will provide the minimum numberm of servers needed to fulfill
SLAs such that
T = h(m,P) ≤ Θ. (6)
We leverage queuing theory to characterize the actual delay of each SLA and concretize the function
h(·), which enables us to better focus on the overall performance of the proposed model and will be
elaborated in Section 5.
For the service model, we focus on three questions. In the interaction process illustrated in
Fig 2, each user needs to report its type information to the CSP. However, this information is
private and customers may seek possible ways to maximize their surplus by misreporting their
type information. A mechanism is said to be DSIC if a user gains most or at least not less by being
truthful, regardless of what the others do [11]. In the context of this paper, we have the following
definition.
Definition 3.2. Every user of type α will report a type α ′ to the CSP, with the aim to maximize
its surplus. Our service framework is said to be DSIC if the user’s surplus is maximized when it
truthfully reports its type, i.e., α ′ = α , no matter whether other users will truthfully do so or not.
Thus, The first question is about providing appropriate incentives via pricing SLAs such that
our service framework is DSIC. The second is about market segmentation, i.e., how different types
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Table 1. Key Notation
Symbol Explanation
L the number of SLAs
φl the delay of the l-th SLA
pl the price of the l-th SLA
T the delay of on-demand service where φ1 = T
p the price of on-demand service where p1 = p
m the total number of servers possessed by a CSP
Λ the total job arrival rate
λl at a single server, the job arrival rate of the l-th SLA
λˆl at a single server, the total job arrival rate of the first l SLAs
Φ the set of the types of all customers
α (resp. α ) the maximum (resp. minimum) type of Φ
Φl the set of the types of the customers who are assigned to the l-th SLA
P the set {Φ1, · · · ,ΦL}
αˆ1, · · · , αˆL+1 a division of Φ used to define Φ1, · · · ,ΦL by (7)
tl the actual job delay of the l-th SLA
of users are grouped together such that each group of users belongs to the same SLA, when the
SLA delays are given in advance, and it characterizes the structural property in the mapping of
the types to the SLAs (i.e., P). This helps CSP and users better understand the market structure.
Then, we will determine the optimal SLA prices given a specific market segmentation. the third
question is what architecture of servers should be used to satisfy (6) for fulfilling SLAs. Then, under
a particular architecture, we need to leverage queuing theory to optimally determine the market
segementation and SLA delays in order to maximize the revenue (5). The main notation used in
this paper is summarized in Table 1.
4 MARKET PROPERTIES
In this section, we suppose the SLA delays φ1,φ2, · · · ,φL are given; then, we show the market
segmentation presents a structural property that there exists a sequence αˆ1, αˆ2, · · · , αˆL+1 ∈ Φ such
that for all l ∈ [1,L] the customers of the types between αˆl and αˆl+1 will be assigned to the l-th SLA.
Further, we derive the optimal SLA prices under which our framework forms a DSIC mechanism
while the CSP’s revenue is maximized.
4.1 Market Segmentation
If a customer is more sensitive to delay, its WTP will decrease more quickly while facing the
same increment in delay. Formally, we have the following relation on the difference of WTPs under
two SLAs.
Lemma 4.1. Let us consider two arbitrary customers of types α1 and α2 with α1 > α2, and two SLAs
k1 and k2 with k1 < k2. The customer of type α1 is more sensitive to delay as explained for Property 1;
the SLA delays satisfy φk1 < φk2 by (2). Then, we have that the difference of the WTPs of the customer
of type α1 respectively under the k1-th and k2-th SLAs is larger than its counterpart for the customer
of type α2, i.e.,
u(α1,φk1 ) − u(α1,φk2 ) > u(α2,φk1 ) − u(α2,φk2 ).
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According to Definition 3.1, the CSP will select for each customer a SLA under which its surplus
is maximized. Roughly, a customer of larger α is more sensitive to delay and will be assigned to a
SLA with a smaller delay, as shown below.
Lemma 4.2. Let us consider two customers of types α1 and α2 where α1 > α2. If the customers of
types α1 and α2 are respectively assigned to the SLAs k1 and k2 (i.e., α1 ∈ Φk1 and α2 ∈ Φk2 ), then we
have
k1 ≤ k2,
where the SLA delays satisfy φk1 ≤ φk2 by (2).
The following proposition characterizes the market segmentation, i.e., the mapping of the types
of customers to the SLAs.
Proposition 4.3. There exists a sequence αˆ1, αˆ2, · · · , αˆL+1 ∈ Φ such that the l-th SLA will be
assigned the customers of type α ∈ Φl , where α = αˆL+1 < · · · < αˆ2 < αˆ1 = α and Φl is a subset of the
customer types defined below:
Φl =
{
Φ ∩ (αˆl+1, αˆl ] , if l ∈ [1,L − 1],
Φ ∩ [αˆL+1, αˆL] , if l = L. (7)
Proposition 4.3 shows that, in a delay-differentiated market, the customers are segmented by a
sequence αˆ1, αˆ2, · · · , αˆL+1 such that the customers of type α ∈ Φl will be assigned to the l-th SLA.
4.2 Optimal DSIC Mechanism
Let us suppose in this subsection we are given a particular market segmentation αˆ1, αˆ2, · · · , αˆL+1
defined in Proposition 4.3. Then, we will derive the corresponding SLA prices p1,p2, · · · ,pL that
simultaneously guarantee that (i) they are optimal to maximize a CSP’s revenue, and (ii) our service
framework forms a DSIC mechanism.
First, we give a definition that is used to define SLA prices.
Definition 4.4. Let u−l = u (αˆl ,φl−1) − u (αˆl ,φl ) for all l ∈ [2,L] where u−l is the difference of the
WTPs of a customer of type αˆl respectively under the (l − 1)-th and l-th SLAs. We define parameter
pˆl to be such that,
(i) pˆ1 = u (αˆ1,φ1) = p, i.e., the price of on-demand instances;
(ii) for all l ∈ [2, L], pˆl is the maximum possible pl that satisfies pl ≤ pˆl−1 − u−l , i.e.,
pˆl = pˆl (αˆ1, · · · , αˆl ,φ1, · · ·φl ) = pˆl−1 − u−l = pˆ1 −
∑l
l ′=2
u−l ′ .
Second, each type of customers is assigned some SLA according to Definition 3.1, and we will
show that, when the SLA prices p1, p2, · · · , pL are set to pˆ1, pˆ2, · · · , pˆL , the market segmentation is
still αˆ1, αˆ2, · · · , αˆL+1, i.e., every customer of type α ∈ Φl is still assigned to the l-th SLA where Φl is
given by (7).
To prove this, we consider the surpluses of a customer of type α ∈ Φl under two adjoining SLAs
whose numbers are simultaneously no larger or smaller than l . Roughly, its surplus under the SLA
whose number is closer to l is always larger than its surplus under the other SLA, as shown below.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose the SLA prices p1,p2, · · · ,pL are set to pˆ1, pˆ2, · · · , pˆL . Let us consider a customer
of type α ∈ Φl and a SLA l ′ where l , l ′ ∈ [1,L] and Φl is given by (7). The surplus of this customer is
such that (i) in the case that l ′ ∈ [2, l], we have
• if α = αˆl and l ′ = l , its surpluses under the l ′-th and (l ′ − 1)-th SLAs are the same, and
• otherwise, its surplus under the l ′-th SLA is larger than its surplus under the (l ′ − 1)-th SLA;
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⋯
⋯ ⋮
A pool of mixed jobs 
of different SLAs
𝑚 servers
dispatching
The priority-based queue at each server
Fig. 3. The priority-based sharing architecture with L = 2: grey rectangles denote all jobs that are dispatched
to multiple servers in spite of their SLAs; at a single server, the jobs of the first SLA (denoted by orange
rectangles) have a higher priority to be served than the jobs of the second SLA (denoted by golden rectangles).
and (ii) in the case that l ′ ∈ [l ,L − 1], its surplus under the l ′-th SLA is larger than its surplus under
the (l ′ + 1)-th SLA.
Using the transitiveness of inequalities, we derive the following proposition with Lemma 4.5.
Proposition 4.6. When the SLA prices p1,p2, · · · ,pL are set to pˆ1, pˆ2, · · · , pˆL , we have for all
l ∈ [1,L] that a customer of type α ∈ Φl will be assigned to the l-th SLA where Φl is given by (7). In
other words, the customer achieves the maximum surplus under the l-th SLA.
Third, we show that, when the SLA delays φ1, · · · ,φL and market segmentation αˆ1, · · · , αˆL+1 are
arbitrarily given, there is a pricing rule such that the SLA prices are optimal and our framework
forms a DSIC mechanism.
Proposition 4.7. When the SLA prices p1,p2, · · · ,pL are set to pˆ1, pˆ2, · · · , pˆL , we have
(i) our service framework forms a DSIC mechanism;
(ii) pˆ1, pˆ2, · · · , pˆL are the optimal SLA prices.
5 SUPPORTING ARCHITECTURES, AND THEIR PERFORMANCE
In Sections 3 and 4, we study a generic service model that offers L SLAs and its properties in
pricing and user behavior. The SLA fulfillment relies on proper provision of servers to jobs to
satisfy (6). In this section, we will consider two typical architectures of servers to serve jobs and
fulfill SLAs. Then, we study their performance and optimal configuration of parameters such as
SLA delays.
5.1 Two Supporting Architectures
A CSP has a total ofm servers. When a job j arrives, it is assigned to a server that will serve it for
a duration sj . We will respectively consider (i) the PBS architecture and (ii) the SMS architecture. In
the former, an arriving job will be assigned to one of them servers, and the order of serving the
jobs at a server depends on their priorities, which depend on the SLAs to which they belong. In the
latter, servers are separated into L groups and each exclusively serves the jobs of the same SLA.
5.1.1 Preliminary. Before elaborating the architectures, we first introduce the polices used in
cloud services for assigning jobs [25]. Suppose there arem′ servers to serve a particular group of
jobs and the mean job arrival rate is Λ′. Typical dispatching policies include (i) Random: for every
job , it chooses every server with the same probability 1m′ and assign j to the chosen server [26, 27],
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dispatching
The FCFS queue at each server
Fig. 4. The separated multi-SLAs architecture with L = 2 andm1 +m2 =m: colored rectangles denote jobs of
different SLAs while colored circles denote servers of different SLAs.
and (ii) Round-Robin (RR): jobs are assigned to servers in a cyclical fashion with the j-th job being
assigned to the i-th server where i = j modm′ [28]. As a result, jobs are evenly dispatched over the
m′ servers. At each server, the arriving jobs form a single queue with the same mean job arrival
rate λ′ = Λ′m′ [29]. The service time of a job is denoted by a random variable x and the mean s of x
is normalized to be one, i.e., s = 1.
The RR and Random policies are also supported by Amazon EC2 to dispatch jobs to servers while
on-demand users are being served [30]. Their prevalence can be due to the following reasons. Each
job needs an individual job assignment decision. Such policies do not need the knowledge of server
states and can form a distributed scheduler where numerous job assignment decisions could be
done instantaneously, thus reducing the scheduling delays. On the other hand, the maintenance of
the state information of all servers relies on a heartbeat mechanism where servers communicate on
their states with a centralized scheduler at a specific frequency and the job assignment decisions
are also made at such a frequency [31]. In larger-scale server systems like cloud systems, to reduce
communication overhead, the frequency has to be low, which leads to a relatively large scheduling
delay [9, 32].
5.1.2 The PBS Architecture. In the PBS architecture, whenever a job arrives, it is assigned to
one of them servers by some dispatching policy described above. The total job arrival rate is Λ and
the job arrival rate at a single server is λ = Λm . At every server, the jobs have L priority classes. For
all l ∈ [1,L − 1], the jobs of SLA l have higher priority to utilize servers than the jobs of SLAs l + 1,
and are said to have a priority l . At the moments of job completion, the server becomes idle and
will select a new job of the highest priority to serve, and jobs of the same priority will be chosen in
a first-come-first-served (FCFS) discipline. While a job j is being served, the nonpreemptive rule is
applied, that is, the job will continuously occupy a server for a duration sj even if other jobs of
higher priorities arrive.
Now, we give the mean delay tl of the jobs of each SLA l ∈ [1,L]. At each server, the job arrival
rate of the l-th SLA is λl = λ · ∑α ∈Φl P(α). The total arrival rate of the jobs of SLAs 1,· · · , l is
λˆl =
∑l
l ′=1 λl ′ . The jobs of all SLAs at every server form a single queue and their job arrivals are
described as a Poisson process with rate λ. The service time x of jobs is assumed to follow a general
distribution where the mean s is one. Such a queue is usually denoted byM/G/1. We can directly
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use the result for aM/G/1 queue with priority in [33] and get the delay of the jobs of the l-th SLA
tl =
0.5 · λ · E[x2]
(1 − λˆl−1) · (1 − λˆl )
, (8)
where l ∈ [1,L], λˆ0 is set to zero trivially, and E[x2] is the second moment of x , i.e., its mean-squared
value.
5.1.3 The SMS Architecture. In the SMS architecture, them servers are separated into L groups,
and each group hasmi servers and forms a module, wherem =
∑L
l=1ml . The l-th module is used
to exclusively serve the jobs of the l-th SLA, and every job that belongs to the l-th SLA will be
assigned to one of theml servers under some dispatching policy such as Random or RR. At every
server, the jobs will be served in a FCFS discipline. The total job arrival rate of the l-th SLA is Λl
and the job arrival rate at a single server is λl = Λlml . The jobs at every server forms a single queue,
and when it is a M/G/1 queue, we have from [33] that the job delay of the l-th SLA is
tl =
0.5 · λl · E[x2]
1 − λl . (9)
5.1.4 On-demand Service System. The delay-differentiated service system of this paper can
be viewed as a complement to the standard on-demand service model, which will be used as a
benchmark. In a pure on-demand system, all jobs are served with a short delay and processed with
the same priority on them servers. Upon arrival of each job, it will be dispatched to one of them
servers under some policy and the jobs at the same server will be served in a FCFS discipline. The
total job arrival rate is Λod , and the job arrival rate at a single server is λod = Λodm . Similar to (9),
we have that the delay of all jobs is
t =
0.5 · λod · E[x2]
1 − λod . (10)
The job delay will be no larger than T , which requires that t ≤ T .
Beyond the above architectural description, we will use in this paper exponential or hyperexpo-
nential distribution to model the service time x . As often used in the literature [26, 32], they have
simple closed-form expressions for E[x2] and can guarantee the existence of E[x2], which enable
analytically evaluating the performance of the architectures above. When x follows an exponential
distribution [26, 32], we have
E[x2] = 2 · s2 = 2. (11)
When x follows a hyperexponential distribution [32], it can be characterized by h tuples (πi ,ηi )
where i ∈ [1,h] and ∑hi=1 ηi = 1: x has a probability ηi to follow an exponential distribution with
rate πi . For an exponential distribution with rate πi , its mean is 1πi . The mean of x is
s =
∑h
i=1
ηi
πi
= 1 (12)
and the second moment of x is
E[x2] =
∑h
i=1
2
π 2i
· ηi . (13)
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5.2 Optimal SLA Delays
The actual experienced job delays of the L SLAs are t1, · · · , tL . As described in (6), tl should be
no larger than the SLA delay φl . The delay of the first SLA is T . Intuitively, we should keep the
other SLA delays as small as possible, i.e., φl = tl for all l ∈ [2,L], in order to maximize the revenue.
In fact, by doing so, we can make every SLA price as high as possible, and we now rigorously prove
this by analyzing the structure of the SLA prices in Definition 4.4.
Proposition 5.1. In order to maximize the revenue, we have φl = tl for all l ∈ [2,L].
5.3 Performance Bounds
In this subsection, we will study the performance of the proposed service system respectively
built on the PBS and SMS architectures. Recall thatG denotes the revenue of the service system
of this paper and we denote by God the revenue of an on-demand service system. The viability of
our service system can be mainly indicated by the ratio ofG toGod , denoted by κ; κ − 1 represents
how much the revenue God is improved by when our service system is used. It is difficult to give a
closed form of the optimal G since this involves solving a system of non-linear equations. We thus
seek to give a bound of κ.
For the PBS-based service system, we will get an upper bound of κ that is close to one. This
implies that, at best, it can marginally outperform the on-demand service system, which will
discourage the adoption of a PBS-based service system. For the SMS-based service system, we will
get a lower bound of κ that is significantly larger than one. This implies that the SMS-based service
system can significantly outperform the on-demand service system, which will support the use of
a SMS-based service system by CSPs. Finally, we will give an optimal algorithm to maximize the
revenue of a SMS-based service system.
5.3.1 A Performance Bound of the PBS-based Service System. When a PBS-based service
system is considered, we denote by Gpbs its revenue. We will derive an upper bound of the ratio
of Gpbs to God . For the standard on-demand service model, it has a fixed price p and guarantees a
small delay of at most T . A CSP’s revenue is maximized when the delay of the first SLA is T and
we have by (10) that the corresponding job arrival rate at a single server is as follows:
λod =
T
A +T
, (14)
whereA = 0.5 ·E[x2]. Further, the maximum revenue that an on-demand service model can achieve
is
God =m · p · λod · s =m · p · T
A +T
. (15)
For the PBS-based service system, we have the following analysis. All jobs of different SLAs are
executed on them servers. The first SLA offers service at a fixed price p and guarantees a small
delay of at most T , and we have by (8) that φ1 = λ · A/
(
1 − λˆ1
)
≤ T , where 0 < λˆ1 < λ < 1. Thus,
we get λ < T /A. A CSP’s revenue is given in (5) and we can get an upper bound of Gpbs :
Gpbs =
L∑
l=1
pl ·m · λl ≤ p ·m ·
L∑
l=1
λl = p ·m · λ < p ·m · T
A
, (16)
where pl ≤ p for all l ∈ [1,L]. It follows from (14) and (16) that
Proposition 5.2. The performance of a PBS-based service model is upperly bounded by 1+ TA times
the optimal performance of the standard on-demand service model, in terms of the revenue, where
A = 0.5 · E[x2].
12
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
1
1
10
20
A
Fig. 5. The Value of A under Varying π1.
When x follows an exponential distribution, we haveA = 1 by (11). When x follows a hyperexpo-
nential distribution, we use an example in [32] to set h = 2, η1 = 0.75 η2 = 0.25; we let π1 ∈ (0, 1),
which represents more jobs have relatively smaller service times. We vary the value of π1 from 0.2
to 0.95 with a step size 0.05, and compute the corresponding value of π2 by (12); then, we can get
the value of A by (13), which is illustrated by the red stars in Fig. 5, where A > 1. In both cases, we
can conclude by Proposition 5.2 that, the upper bound in Proposition 5.2 is at most 1 +T , and the
PBS-based service system can only outperform the standard on-demand service system marginally,
since the delay of the first SLA T is small.
5.3.2 A Performance Bound of the SMS-based Service System. When a SMS-based service
system is considered, we denote by Gsms its revenue, and by G∗sms its optimal revenue where
G∗sms ≥ Gsms . In cloud markets, the total number of servers is large so that the revenue from a
single server could be negligible, in comparison with the total revenue. Thus, to give a closed
form of the lower bound, we relax in this subsubsection the constraint that the number of servers
assigned to each SLA is integer and allow the number to be fractional; the total revenue after
relaxation approximates the total revenue of an integer solution. Further, we havemi · λi = Λi , and
λi and φi satisfy the relation (9); for i ∈ [1,L], the number of servers assigned to the i-th SLA is as
follows:
mi =
Λi · (φi +A)
φi
, (17)
where A = 0.5 · E[x2]. Furthermore, it is known that there are many applications whose workload
is delay-tolerant, as illustrated by the prosperity of spot market [3]; a CSP like Amazon EC2 or
Microsot Azure also has the ability to adjust the provision of servers to properly satisfy the needs
of users.
We consider a specific setting of the service system where two SLAs are offered respectively for
latency-critical and delay-tolerant jobs; the corresponding revenue can be viewed as a lower bound
of G∗sms . The setting is as follows: (i) we choose some α ′ ∈
(
α , α
)
such that all customers with α
larger than α ′ will be processed under the first SLA and the others are processed under the second
SLA (i.e., αˆ2 = α ′), and (ii) the CSP intends to adapt its capacity (i.e., the value ofm2) to guarantee
that the delay φ2 of the second SLA is set to some value φ ′2; the α ′ and φ ′2 are system parameters
set by the CSP. α ′ determines the proportion of the arriving jobs to be processed under each SLA.
Let Φ1 = Φ ∩ (α ′,α], and Φ2 = Φ − Φ1; we have that the job arrival rates for the first and second
SLAs are respectively: Λ1 =
∑
α ∈Φ1 P(α) · Λ and Λ2 = Λ − Λ1. By Proposition 4.7, the prices of the
first and second SLAs are p1 = p and p2 = p1 + (u(αˆ2,φ2) −u(αˆ2,φ1)) = u(αˆ2,φ2) where φ1 = T . We
have that the CSP’s total revenue is
Gsms = p · Λ1 + u
(
α ′, φ ′2
) · Λ2. (18)
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If the CSP only provides on-demand service, the (optimal) revenue God is as follows:
God =m · p · λod = (m1 +m2) · p · T
A +T
, (19)
where λod is given in (14). The below conclusion follows from (18) and (19):
Proposition 5.3. The optimal revenue G∗sms of a SMS-based service system is at least κ ′ times the
revenue of an on-demand service system where
κ ′ =
Gsms
God
≥
(
p · Λ1 + u
(
α ′, φ ′2
) · Λ2) · (A +T )
(m1 +m2) · p ·T , (20)
wherem1 andm2 are given in (17), A = 0.5 · E[x2], and α ′ and φ ′2 are system parameters set by the
CSP.
Proposition 5.3 provides a closed form of the lower bound κ ′ of the ratio of G∗sms to God , and
κ ′ − 1 represents the minimum revenue improvement brought by a SMS-based service system. One
of its advantages lies in that one can get the value of κ ′ − 1 through an easy computation of (20),
without the need of executing a procedure that one may need to take some effort to implement.
Now, we give an instance of Proposition 5.3. We use the WTP function in (1) where β = 3:
u(α ,φ) = p · (1 − (α · (φ −T ))3) , t ∈ [T ,+∞). (21)
The parameter α ′ is set to be such that a significant portion of jobs (e.g., half jobs) are processed
under each SLA. Since there are many delay-tolerant jobs in cloud markets, φˆ0 = 1α ′ +T can be
much larger than T and it is the minimum delay under which the WTPS of the customers of the
second SLA will become zero. Correspondingly, the delay φ2 of the second SLA is set to φˆ0+T2 ; this
leads to that the price p2 of the second SLA will be 0.875 · p, which is not far from the on-demand
price p. We set Λ1 = Λ2 = 0.5 · Λ. In this case, we have that
κ ′ =
G∗sms
God
≥ 1.875 ·
(
1 + AT
)(
2 + AT + 2 · Aφˆ0
) . (22)
The lower bound of (22) decreases in T and increases in φˆ0; we set T to a larger value 0.05 and φˆ0
to 0.5. In this case, when the service time x follows an exponential distribution, we have A = 1 by
(11) and κ ′ ≥ 1.514. When x follows a hyperexponential distribution, we still use the setting in
Section 5.3.1 and the value of κ ′ is illustrated in Fig. 6 where κ ′ ≥ 1.515. For both distributions, we
have that, if the CSP adopts the proposed service model under the SMS architecture, the revenue can
be at least 1.5 times the optimal revenue of the pure on-demand service system, with a remarkable
improvement.
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Algorithm 1: Optimal Parameter Configuration
1 G∗ ← 0, A ′ ← A,M ′ ←M; // G∗: record the current optimal revenue; A′ and M′: record
the tuples unconsidered respectively in A and M
2 whileM ′ , ∅ do
3 Get a tuple (i1, i2, · · · , iL+1) fromM ′, and the l-th module is assignedml = il+1 − il servers;
4 while A ′ , ∅ do
5 Get a tuple seq = (α1,α2, · · · ,αL+1) from A ′;
6 Compute the job arrival rate Λl of the l-th SLA by Equation (4) and Proposition 4.3;
7 For all l ∈ [1,L], compute the actual job delay tl of the l-th SLA using (9);
8 if φ1 ≤ T < φ1 < φ2 < · · · < φL then
// The delay of the first SLA is no larger than T and the SLA delays are increasing
9 Set the delay φl of the l-th SLA to tl for all l ∈ [2,L], and φ1 to T ;
10 Use Proposition 4.7 to compute the optimal prices of SLAs p1,p2, · · · ,pL ;
11 Compute the revenue G by (5), wherewl = Λl · s =m · λl · s;
12 if G > G∗ then
13 G∗ ← G, φ∗l ← φl , p∗l ← pl ,ml ←m∗l , for all l ∈ [1,L]; // record the optimal
SLA delays and prices, and division of servers
14 Delete seq from A ′;
15 Delete the tuple (i1, i2, · · · , iL+1) fromM ′;
5.4 Optimally Configuring the SMS-based Service System
In this subsection, we will give a procedure to determine the optimal SLA delays and prices of a
SMS-based service system, in order to maximize the revenue. The delays and prices are determined
by the market segmentation αˆ1, αˆ2, · · · , αˆL+1, and the numbers of servers assigned to different SLAs
m1,m2, · · · ,mL . Specifically, as shown in Proposition 4.6, the sequence αˆ1, αˆ2, · · · , αˆL+1 determines
the job arrival rate of each SLA by (4). The numbersm1,m2, · · · ,mL determine the delays of SLAs
φ1,φ2, · · · ,φL by (9), which further determine the prices of SLAs by Proposition 4.7. Thus, our
decision variables are αˆ2, · · · , αˆL andm1, · · · ,mL with the aim of maximizing the revenue, where
αˆ1 = α , αˆL+1 = α , and
∑L
l=1ml =m.
Now, we give a procedure to determine the optimal decision variables under the SMS architecture.
αˆ1, αˆ2, · · · , αˆL+1 uniquely corresponds to an element in the following set
A = {(α1,α2, · · · ,αL+1) | α = α1 > α2 > · · · > αL+1 = α ,
α2,α3, · · · ,αL ∈ Φ},
where αˆl = αl for all l ∈ [1,L + 1]. m1,m2, · · · ,mL uniquely correspond to an element in the
following set
M = {(i1, i2, · · · , iL+1) | 0 = i1 < i2 < · · · < iL+1 =m} .
The numberml is set to il+1 − il for all l ∈ [1,L]. We can give a procedure, presented as Algorithm 1,
to determine the optimal tuples in A andM such that the CSP achieves the maximum revenue;
then, the corresponding delays and prices under these two tuples will be the optimal ones, and we
have the following conclusion.
Proposition 5.4. Algorithm 1 gives the optimal delays and prices of SLAs, and its time complexity
is O (mL−1 · nL−1) .
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Fig. 7. Revenue Improvement: the red (resp. blue) stars are for the case of low (resp. high) delay-tolerance;
the left subfigure illustrates the maximum revenue improvement under a given number of SLAs L, while the
right subfigure illustrates the corresponding average load per server; in the on-demand service system, the
average load per server is 0.0476.
6 NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically show the revenue improvement that a SMS-based service system
achieves over the standard on-demand service system. Besides, we adapt the architecture of [4, 5]
to the service model of this paper and compare it with the SMS-based service system; the related
results and analysis are put in the Appendix.
6.1 Experimental Setting
There are a total ofm servers and the WTP function is given in (21). The on-demand price p
(i.e., the price p1 of the first SLA) is normalized as 1, and its delay T is 0.05. Given a delay-cost
type α , let φ ′0 =
1
α and a customer’s WTP becomes zero when the delay φ0 = φ
′
0 +T , and each α
uniquely corresponds to a φ0. There are n = 50 types of customers and for all i ∈ [1,n] the WTP of
the i-th type of customers becomes zero when the delay is φ0,i = T + φ ′0,i ; here, φ ′0,i = ϵ if i = 1
and φ ′0,i = (i − 1) · δ otherwise, where ϵ is arbitrarily small. We have φ0,1 < φ0,2 < · · · < φ0,50. The
first type of customers is the most delay-sensitive and its WTP becomes zero even if the delay is
slightly larger than T . The value of δ determines the delay-tolerance of the population, and if it is
large, the population has a high delay-tolerance. We consider two cases where the delay-tolerance
is low and high respectively: (i) δ = 0.02 and (ii) δ = 0.04.
The mean arrival rate of the jobs of all types is Λ; the service time of jobs follows an exponential
distribution and their mean is normalized as one, i.e., s = 1. Customers are independently and
uniformly distributed over the n types, and the mean job arrival rate of each type is Λn . Then,
ρ = Λm · s = λ denotes the average load per server when allm servers are considered. We denote by
G∗sms the optimal revenue achieved by Algorithm 1. In an on-demand service system, God denotes
its revenue and is defined in (15); λod denotes the maximum load per server and it equals 0.0476
since t ≤ T in (10); hence, the maximum revenue that a CSP can obtain from a single server is also
0.0476. The following ratio is the main performance metric in our experiments:
γ = G∗sms/God .
Specifically, if γ > 1, the SMS-based service system will outperform the on-demand system; the
larger the value of γ , the higher the revenue improvement.
6.2 Numerical Results
The service model of this paper can be viewed as a complement to the on-demand service, and it
can attract potential delay-tolerant customers from the market and improve the revenue efficiency,
i.e., the average revenue per server. In practice, a CSP like Amazon EC2 or Microsoft Azure often
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Fig. 8. Revenue Improvement γ under Varying Load λ: (i) the left and right subfigures correspond to the
low and high delay-tolerance cases respectively; (ii) the magenta, blue, red, black and green stars denote the
revenue improvement γ in the case of two, three, four, five and six SLAs respectively.
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Fig. 9. The SLA Prices under Varying Load λ: (i) the left and right subfigures correspond to the low and
high delay-tolerance cases respectively; (ii) in each subfigure, the red, blue and magenta markers denote the
results when L = 2, 3, 4 respectively; (iii) the markers "stars", "circles" and "squares" denote the SLA prices of
the second, third and fourth SLAs respectively; the price of the first SLA is one.
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Fig. 10. The SLA Delays under Varying Load λ: (i) the left and right subfigures correspond to the low and
high delay-tolerance cases respectively; (ii) the stars illustrate the SLA delays φl while the squares illustrate
the value of φ0,il ; (iii) the red markers are for the second SLA when offering two SLAs; (iv) the blue and
magenta markers are respectively for the second and third SLAs when offering three SLAs.
has rich capital and can adapt its capacity to accept and serve all arriving jobs and maintain its
load per server at a desired level.
6.2.1 Revenue Improvement. In Section 5.3.2, we have given a lower bound of the performance
in (22), and consider the setting that two SLAs are offered and each SLA is assigned half the jobs.
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When it is further concretized by our experimental setting, we have φˆ0 = 0.05 + 25 · δ . In the
low delay-tolerant case, δ = 0.02 and φˆ0 = 0.55; the revenue improvement γ is 1.536. In the high
delay-tolerant case, δ = 0.04 and φˆ0 = 1.05; γ is 1.647.
In the rest of this section, we fix the number of serversm = 100 and allocate a proper proportion
of servers to each SLA. We vary the average load per server λ that increases from 0.05 with a step
size 0.01, and calculate the revenue improvement γ . The value of γ varies under different load λ.
The maximum revenue improvement under a given number of SLAs L is summarized in Fig. 7 (left),
ranging from 182.5% to 309.9%; the corresponding optimal λ is given in Fig. 7 (right). From the figure,
we can see that (i) the larger the number L of SLAs, the higher the revenue improvement γ , and (ii)
the higher the delay-tolerance, the higher the revenue improvement. In the low delay-tolerance
case, when the number of SLAs offered by a CSP varies from two to six, the revenue improvement
increases from 182.5% to 226.0%. The revenue improvement is remarkable even when L = 2. In the
high delay-tolerance case, the revenue improvement is 229.1% even when L = 2. In both low and
high delay-tolerance cases, when L ≥ 4, the revenue improvement increases only marginally as L
increases. This may imply that, in practice, offering two or three SLAs may be enough.
6.2.2 Further Observation. In the following, we illustrate some detailed numerical results to
help us understand the features of an optimal parameter configuration.
First, we describe the general features. By Proposition 4.7, there exists a sequence 1 = i1 < i2 <
· · · < iL ≤ n such that the l-th SLA is assigned the customers whose φ0,i is such that i ∈ [il , il+1)
if l ∈ [1,L − 1] and i ∈ [iL, n] if l = L; here, we have αˆl = 1/φ ′0,il . For all l ∈ [2,L], the price pl of
the l-th SLA equals pl−1 minus the difference u(αˆl ,φl−1) − u(αˆl ,φl ) where φl−1 < φl . Roughly, the
revenue is the average price times the load of them servers. To maximize the revenue, we need
keep the SLA prices high, and the sequence i2, i3, · · · , iL should be selected in a way such that, for
all l ∈ [2,L],
(i) the SLA delay φl is significantly smaller than φ0,il ;
(ii) the difference of φl and φl−1 is small;
(iii) the value of φ0,il is as large as possible;
(iv) the SLA delay φl is significantly larger than T .
When the delay is small, the WTP decreases slowly, as explained in Section 3.1. The first two points
guarantee that pl is not far from the on-demand price p. By (9), the last two guarantee that, the
load λl per server of the l-th SLA is significantly larger than λod , leading to a larger overall load λ
per server.
Second, the above features are also embodied in our numerical results. The revenue improvement
under varying load are illustrated in Fig. 8. The corresponding SLA prices and delays are given
in Fig. 9 and 10. Given the number of SLAs L, the revenue improvement γ always increases until
the load λ increases to some threshold; afterwards, γ begins to decrease since every server has a
too heavy load. As illustrated in Fig 10, if λ is too large, the SLA delay φl will be large and close to
φ0,il ; then, the WTPs of customers are low, as well as the SLA price, as illustrated in Fig. 9; thus, γ
becomes smaller even if more workload is processed.
For example, in the low delay-tolerance case with L = 2, the optimal γ is achieved when the load
λ is 0.1, as shown in Fig. 7 (right). As the load λ increases from 0.05 to 0.1, γ keeps increasing, as
illustrated by the magenta curve in Fig. 8 (left); afterwards, γ begins to decrease. As illustrated by
the red curve in Fig. 10 (left), when the load λ is 0.12, the SLA delay φ2 is 0.2228, which is close to
φ0,i2 = 0.23; then, the SLA price p2 is 0.1149. In contrast, when λ = 0.1, the SLA delay φ2 = 0.1836,
which is significantly smaller than φ0,i2 = 0.29. Thus, to maintain a large γ , the average load λ per
server should be maintained at a proper level by adjusting the total number of serversm.
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7 CONCLUSION
In cloud computing, there exist both latency-critical jobs and jobs that could tolerate different
degrees of delay. The resource efficiency of a system is much dependent on the job’s latency
requirement. We propose a delay-differentiated pricing and service model where multiple SLAs are
provided, as a complement to the existing on-demand service system. The structure of the market
formed by the proposed model is studied and we thus derive the pricing rule under which the
proposed framework forms a DSIC mechanism and the CSP’s revenue is maximized. We consider
two architectures for fulfilling SLAs: the first appears more prevalent and advanced in the literature
while the second seems very simple. Our rigorous analysis discourages the adoption of the first
architecture and supports the use of the second one. Finally, numerical results are given to show
the viability of the proposed service model in comparison with a pure on-demand service system,
showing a revenue improvement by up to 209.9%.
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A PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let φ ∈ [T ,+∞). It suffices to prove the conclusion that д(φ) = u(α2,φ) −
u(α1,φ) is an increasing function of φ; then, the lemma holds since д(φk2 ) > д(φk1 ). To prove this,
we note that the derivative of д(φ) is
д′(φ) = ∂u(α2,φ)
∂φ
− ∂u(α1,φ)
∂φ
.
Since α1 > α2, we have д′(φ) > 0 by the fourth point of Property 1, and д(φ) is increasing.
Proof of Lemma 4.2.We prove this by contradiction. Suppose k2 < k1 and the SLA delays satisfy
φk2 < φk1 . The customer of type α1 (resp. α2) achieves the maximum surplus under the SLA k1
(resp. k2), and we thus have
u(α1,φk1 ) − pk1 ≥ u(α1,φk2 ) − pk2 (23)
u(α2,φk1 ) − pk1 ≤ u(α2,φk2 ) − pk2 (24)
Multiplying (23) by -1 and adding the resulting inequality to (24), we have u(α2,φk1 ) − u(α1,φk1 ) ≤
u(α2,φk2 ) −u(α1,φk2 ). However, since α1 > α2 and k2 < k1, we have by Lemma 4.1 that u(α1,φk2 ) −
u(α1,φk1 ) > u(α2,φk2 ) − u(α2,φk1 ), which contradicts the previous inequality.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Each type of customers will be assigned to some SLA, and Φl denotes the set
of the types of the customers assigned to the l-th SLA for all l ∈ [1,L]. Let αˆl denote the maximum
type in Φl such that only the customers of type α ≤ αˆl will possibly be assigned to the l-th SLA.
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For all l ∈ [1,L − 1], when the customers of types αˆl and αˆl+1 are respectively assigned the l-th and
(l + 1)-th SLAs, we have by Lemma 4.2 that αˆl > αˆl+1, which can be easily proved by contradiction.
A customer of type α will be assigned to a SLA whose number is no larger than one (i.e., the first
SLA) since α ≥ αˆ1. Thus, we have αˆ1 = α .
By Lemma 4.2, we also have that (i) for all l ∈ [1,L − 1] every customer of type α ∈ (αˆl+1, αˆl ] ∩Φ
will be assigned to a SLA whose number l ′ is no smaller than l but no larger than l + 1, and (ii)
every customer of type α ∈ [α , αˆL] ∩ Φ will be assigned to a SLA whose number is no smaller than
L since α ≤ αˆL . In the first case, α > αˆl+1 and αˆl+1 is the maximum type of Φl+1; thus l ′ will be
smaller than l + 1 and equal l . The proposition thus holds.
Proof of Lemma 4.5. In the first case, if α = αˆl and l ′ = l , the surplus difference of the customer
under the l ′-th and (l ′ − 1)-th SLAs is (u(αˆl ,φl ) − pl ) − (u(αˆl ,φl−1) − pl−1); it equals zero due to
Definition 4.4. Otherwise, we have either α < αˆl or l ′ < l : in the former, α < αˆl ≤ αˆl ′ since
l ′ ∈ [2, l]; in the latter, α ≤ αˆl < αˆl ′ . Thus, we have α < αˆl ′ . The surplus difference under two
adjoining SLAs is
(u(α ,φl ′) − pl ′) − (u(α ,φl ′−1) − pl ′−1)
(a)
= (u (αˆl ′,φl ′−1) − u (αˆl ′,φl ′)) − (u(α ,φl ′−1) − u(α ,φl ′))
(b)
> 0;
here, equation (a) is due to Definition 4.4, and (b) is due to Lemma 4.1. In the second case, we have
αˆl ′+1 < α since α ∈ (αˆl+1, αˆl ] and l ′ ≥ l , and the difference of the surpluses of the customer under
the l ′-th and (l ′ + 1)-th SLAs is
(u(α ,φl ′) − pl ′) − (u(α ,φl ′+1) − pl ′+1)
(c)
= (u(α ,φl ′) − u(α ,φl ′+1)) − (u(αˆl ′+1,φl ′) − u(αˆl ′+1,φl ′+1))
(d )
> 0;
here, equation (c) is due to Definition 4.4, and (d) is due to Lemma 4.1. Hence, the lemma holds.
Proof of Lemma 4.6. In the case that α , αˆl , we have by Lemma 4.5 the conclusion that, (i) for all
l ′ ∈ [2, l], the customer achieves a higher surplus under l ′-th SLA than under the (l ′−1)-th SLA, and
(ii) for all l ′ ∈ [l ,L − 1], it achieves a higher surplus under the l ′-th SLA than under the (l ′ + 1)-th
SLA; thus, the customer achieves the highest surplus under the l-th SLA. In the case that α = αˆl ,
we still have the above conclusion, except that the customer achieves the same surplus under the
l-th and (l − 1)-th SLAs when l ′ ∈ [2, l] and l ′ = l . Hence, the customer achieves the maximum
surplus under both the l-th and (l − 1)-th SLAs. According to Definition 3.1, the proposition holds
in both cases.
Proof of Lemma 4.7. Let us consider a customer of type α ∈ Φl who reports to the CSP that
its type is α ′. No matter what the other users do, we have by Proposition 4.6 that it achieves the
maximum surplus under the l-th SLA and will be assigned by the CSP to the l-th SLA when it
truthfully reports its type, i.e., α ′ = α . Thus, it cannot gain more by misreporting its type, since
misreport can lead to that it is assigned to the l-th SLA or the other SLAs. The first point thus holds
by Definition 3.2.
The objective of our framework is tomaximize (5); given themarket segmentation αˆ1, αˆ2, · · · , αˆL+1
defined in Proposition 4.3, the job arrival rate of each SLA is fixed by (4) and we have the conclusion
that the larger the SLA prices, the larger the value ofAG . The first SLA’s price p1 is fixed and equals
p. In order to guarantee the truthfulness of the customers of type α ∈ Φl , a necessary condition is
that uil (α ,φl−1) − pl−1 ≤ uil (α ,φl ) − pl , for all l ∈ [2,L]. Further, irrespective of the value of pl−1,
the maximum possible value of pl is pˆl for all l ∈ [2,L]. Thus, the second point holds.
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Proof of Lemma 5.1. We prove this by contradiction. We have φl ≥ tl for all l ∈ [2,L]. Let us
consider an optimal solution where the SLA delays and prices are φ∗l and p
∗
l for all l ∈ [2,L], and
the market segmentation is αˆ1, αˆ2, · · · , αˆL+1. Suppose there exists some SLA l ∈ [2,L] such that
φ∗l > tl ; let l
′ denote the minimum such l , where φ∗2 = t2, · · · ,φ∗l ′−1 = tl ′−1 if l ′ > 2. If we decrease
the delay of the l ′-th SLA to tl ′ and keep the others unchanged, we denote the corresponding
prices by p1, · · · ,pL . It suffices to prove the conclusion that pl > p∗l for all l ∈ [l ′,L] and pl = p∗l
for all l ∈ [2, l ′ − 1] if l ′ > 2. This will lead to that the revenue (5) increases, which contradicts the
assumption that p∗1, · · · ,p∗L are optimal; the proposition thus holds. Now, we prove the conclusion.
The SLA prices are determined by Proposition 4.7. First, we have p∗l = pl for all l ∈ [2, l ′ − 1] if
l ′ > 2; this is due to that φ∗2, · · · ,φ∗l ′−1 does not change. Second, for the l ′-th SLA, we have
pl ′ = pl ′−1 + u(αˆl ′, tl ′) − u(αˆl ′, tl ′−1)
(a)
> p∗l ′−1 + u(αˆl ′,φ∗l ′) − u(αˆl ′,φ∗l ′−1) = p∗l ′ .
The inequality (a) is due to that pl ′−1 = p∗l ′−1, u(αˆl ′, tl ′) > u(αˆl ′,φ∗l ′), and tl ′−1 = φ∗l ′−1. Third, for the
(l ′ + 1)-th SLA, we have
pl ′+1 = pl ′ + u(αˆl ′+1,φ∗l ′+1) − u(αˆl ′+1, tl ′)
= pl ′−1 + u(αˆl ′, tl ′) − u(αˆl ′,φ∗l ′−1) + u(αˆl ′+1,φ∗l ′+1) − u(αˆl ′+1, tl ′)
(b)
> p∗l ′−1 + u(αˆl ′,φ∗l ′) − u(αˆl ′,φ∗l ′−1) + u(αˆl ′+1,φ∗l ′+1) − u(αˆl ′+1,φl ′)
= p∗l ′+1.
Here, the inequality (b) is due to Lemma 4.1. Fourth, if l ′ + 2 ≤ L, for all l ∈ [l ′ + 2,L], we have by a
simple mathematical induction that
pl = pl−1 + u(αˆl ,φ∗l ) − u(αˆl ,φ∗l−1)
(c)
> p∗l−1 + u(αˆl ,φ∗l ) − u(αˆl ,φ∗l−1) = p∗l ′ .
Here, the inequality (c) is due to pl−1 > p∗l−1.
Proof of Proposition 5.4. Algorithm 1 searches each possible pair of (α1,α2, · · · , αL+1) and
(i1, i2, · · · , iL+1) respectively in A and M (lines 1, 2, 3, 14, 4, 5, 13 of Algorithm 1), and com-
putes the corresponding revenue under this pair (lines 6-10). Among all pairs that have been
searched so far, it records the current maximum revenue and the corresponding SLA delays and
prices, and the numbers of servers assigned to SLAs (lines 1, 11, 12). Thus, the algorithm will
return the optimal solution. The sizes ofM and A are respectively polynomial inm and n (i.e.,( m
L−1
)
and
( n
L−1
)
). The loop in line 4 is nested in the loop in line 2; hence, the time complexity is
O (mL−1 · nL−1) .
B ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS
As seen in Section 1, our framework differs from [4, 5] in several aspects. Nevertheless, the
service model in Section 3 and 4 is generic. The architecture of [4, 5] can be adapted to our model,
and roughly viewed as a hybrid of the PBS and SMS architectures. Specifically, all servers are
separated into two parts: the first are used to fulfill the first SLA, as done by the first module of
the SMS architecture; the second use priority queues to fulfill the SLAs 2, · · · ,L, as done by the
PBS architecture. Specially, when the number of SLAs is two (i.e., L = 2), the SMS and hybrid
architectures are the same and the model has the same performance under both architectures, which
can achieve a significantly larger revenue than the pure on-demand service model. Generally, the
PBS-based service system has a performance close to the on-demand service system but performs
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Fig. 11. Revenue Ratio γˆ with L SLAs: the red (resp. blue) stars correspond to the case of low (resp. high)
delay-tolerance.
worse than the SMS-based system since the PBS architecture achieves a lower utilization. It can be
expected that the hybrid architecture has a in-between performance, as shown later.
We denote by G∗hyb the maximum revenue achieved by our service model under the hybrid
architecture. For all l ∈ [2,L], let λˆ′l denote the total job arrival rate of SLAs 2, · · · , l at a single
server; we can derive the actual delay tl of the l-th SLA by (11) and the equation (8) for the PBS
architecture, and have
tl = λˆ
′
L/((1 − λˆ′l−1) · (1 − λˆ′l )), (25)
where λˆ′1 is set to zero trivially. The value of G∗hyb can be computed by a small modification of the
line 7 of Algorithm 1 where for all l ∈ [2,L] we change to use (25) to compute tl . The revenue ratio
γˆ , defined below, is used to show which of the SMS and Hybrid architectures is better:
γˆ = G∗hyb/G∗sms .
If γˆ ≤ 1, the service model under the hybrid architecture will be no better than the SMS-based
service system. This is exactly shown by the numerical results illustrated in Fig. 11.
The reason for γˆ ≤ 1 is mainly due to (i) the correlation of the SLA delays in the hybrid
architecture and (ii) the delay-sensitivity of the jobs of SLA 2, both of which place limitations on
the power of some jobs with larger delay-tolerance to achieve a higher utilization of servers. First,
we have by (25) that the actual delays t2, · · · , tL are all constrained by the total job arrival rate λˆ′L ,
which is also the average load per server in the second part. Second, there is a sequence i1, i2, · · · ,
iL for mapping jobs to SLAs, as described in the last subsubsection. In the second part, the most
delay-sensitive jobs have a type αˆ2 = 1/φ ′0,i2 , and are assigned to the second SLA, which requires a
small SLA delay φ2 to guarantee that the SLA price p2 does not decrease to a negligible value. This
further leads to a small λˆ′L .
For example, in the low delay-tolerance case with L = 4, the first and second parts have 51 and
49 servers respectively. The market segmentation is (i2, i3, i4) = (13, 19, 30) and we correspondingly
have (φ0,i2 ,φ0,i3 ,φ0,i4 ) = (0.29, 0.41, 0.63). The SLA delays and prices are as follows: (φ1,φ2,φ3,φ4) =
(0.05, 0.1590, 0.1709, 0.1973) and (p1,p2,p3,p4) = (1, 0.9063, 0.8963, 0.8889). Specially, φ2 has to be
small and is around 0.5 times φ0,i2 to guarantee that the price p2 = u(αˆ2,φ2) is not low, as introduced
in Section 3.1. By (25), the value of φ2 further limits that λˆ′L has to be small where φ2 = t2. In the
experiments, we have (λˆ′2, λˆ′3, λˆ′4) = (0.02449, 0.06939, 0.1551). This leads to that the second part of
servers achieve relatively low utilization and revenue. Finally, for them servers, the average load
per server is 0.1.
In contrast, the delays of different SLAs in the SMS architecture are independent by (9), which
unlocks the power of trading the job’s delay-tolerance for a higher utilization. Specifically, the
numbers of servers assigned to different SLAs are (m1,m2,m3,m4) = (21, 24, 28, 27). The market
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segmentation is (i2, i3, i4) = (5, 12, 26) and correspondingly (φ0,i2 ,φ0,i3 ,φ0,i4 ) = (0.13, 0.27, 0.55).
The SLA delays and prices are (φ1,φ2,φ3,φ4) = (0.05, 0.07527, 0.1364, 0.2857) and (p1,p2,p3,p4) =
(1, 0.9685, 0.9095, 0.8099). Although the value of φ2 is still small, it imposes no constraints on
the value of λ4, i.e., the average load per server of the fourth SLA. In the experiments, we have
(λ2, λ3, λ4) = (0.07000, 0.1200, 0.2222). For them servers, the average load per server is 0.12, which
is larger than the one in the hybrid architecture, and the revenue ratio γˆ=0.8753.
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